In this paper, we argue that credit market imperfections impact not only the level of unemployment, but also its persistence. For this purpose, we …rst develop a theoretical model based on the equilibrium matching framework of Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides (2000) where we introduce credit constraints. We show these credit constraints not only increase steady-state unemployment, but also slow down the transitional dynamics. We then provide an empirical illustration based on a country panel dataset of 19 OECD countries. Our results suggest that credit market imperfections would signi…cantly increase the persistence of unemployment.
I Introduction
An important stream of literature has dealt with the incidence of credit market imperfections on the level of unemployment (see e.g. Acemoglu (2001) or Wasmer and Weil (2004) ). These papers explain how unemployment may be worsened by frictions outside the labor market, particularly in the credit market. However, the way credit frictions in ‡uence the transitional dynamics of unemployment is not obvious. In this paper, we extend the equilibrium matching framework of Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides (2000) by introducing credit constraints. We show that when these constraints are binding, not only the steady-state level of unemployment is increased, but the transitional dynamics also decelerates. We then provide an empirical illustration based on a panel of OECD countries. Our results suggest that credit market imperfections do increase the persistence of unemployment.
We …rst provide a theoretical argument within a simple matching model. Wages are exogenous and workers lend their money to representative banks. Building new jobs requires capital.
Entrepreneurs do not have capital on their own and thereby have to borrow from banks. Absent credit market imperfections, entrepreneurs create jobs until congestion externalities in the recruiting process make job creation no longer pro…table. Our departure from the standard matching model lies in the introduction of a credit constraint in the spirit of Matsuyama (2007) :
Entrepreneurs can only borrow a fraction of pledgeable assets. When the total value of pledgeable assets is too low, job creation is restricted. The steady state in the constrained regime is therefore characterized by higher unemployment. Moreover, as unemployment converges to its steady-state value, the number of jobs changes, a¤ecting the total value of pledgeable assets.
Through this channel, the transitional dynamics is slowed down, and unemployment becomes more persistent.
To illustrate this mechanism, we perform an empirical exercise on a panel of 19 OECD countries, during the period 1982-2003. Data were drawn from Bassanini and Duval (2006) for the labor market institutions and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2006) for …nancial development variables. We observe that private credit by deposit money banks as a percentage of GDP would be a signi…cant determinant of the unemployment level, in addition to the 1-period lagged value of the unemployment rate and the traditional factors. 1 Without loss of generality, we can arguably think of this private credit variable as inversely related to the stringency of credit constraints. Interestingly, the interaction between private credit and lagged unemployment appears to have a signi…cant negative impact on the level of unemployment. Put di¤erently, the development of private credit would signi…cantly lower unemployment persistence.
Our contribution follows the literature on the macroeconomic consequences of credit market frictions. The seminal papers of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) explain how credit market frictions amplify business cycle ‡uctuations through a …nancial accelerator mechanism. However, they assume away labor market imperfections, and in particular matching unemployment. Acemoglu (2001) investigates how credit constraints can a¤ect the dynamics of unemployment, and argues that credit market imperfections increase the level and persistence of unemployment. In his model, credit frictions induce some individuals that are skilled enough but without su¢ cient wealth to be workers rather than entrepreneurs. In our model, credit frictions in ‡uence more speci…cally the volume of credit devoted to job creation. 
II The model
Time is continuous and goes forever. The economy consists of three types of risk-neutral agents:
workers, entrepreneurs and banks, who all discount future at a common rate > 0. Workers can be either employed or unemployed, and lend their savings to banks. Entrepreneurs own jobs that are either vacant or …lled. They have no personal capital, so they need banks to …nance the creation of new jobs. Competition among banks is perfect.
II.1 Matching technology
There is a unit mass of workers that are either employed or unemployed. Let L be the number of employed workers, so there are 1 L unemployed workers. The total mass of jobs is endogenous.
Jobs can be either …lled or vacant and require an exogenous amount of k units of goods (capital).
L also equals the number of …lled jobs. Let V be the (endogenous) number of vacant jobs. The matching function Q (U; V ) expresses the ‡ow of hiring per unit of time as the function of the number of unemployed workers and vacancies. We assume that Q (:; :) is increasing and concave with respect to both arguments and that Q (:; :) exhibits constant returns to scale. 2 We in addition assume that Q (:; :) is continuously di¤erentiable over R 2 + . Let = V = (1 L) denote the tightness on the labor market.
The rate at which a vacancy meets a worker is given by Q (U; V ) =V = Q (1= ; 1) def q ( ).
From the assumptions we made about the matching function, we deduce that q (:) is a decreasing and di¤erentiable function of . The rate at which an unemployed worker exits unemployment is Q (U; V ) =U = q ( ). This rate is an increasing and di¤erentiable function of . Finally, jobs are dissolved exogenously at rate > 0.
The level of employment (the number of …lled jobs) evolves according to:
In steady state, this gives the Beveridge Curve
This curve de…nes an upward-sloping and convex curve labelled (BC) in the (L; ) plan (see Figure 1 ). When the economy is located in the left (resp. in the right) of BC curve, L increases (decreases), so the economy moves rightwards (leftwards).
II.2 Workers
They receive the exogenous wage w when employed and 0 income when unemployed. They enjoy consumption thanks to a linear utility function and they deposit their savings at the banks. Hence savings are in…nitely elastic in the interest rate, so banks generate revenue at the workers'discount rate .
II.3 Entrepreneurs
A …lled job produces a ‡ow y > w of production. Let r be the (endogenous) interest rate, so the ‡ow of reimbursment equals r k. The value J of a …lled job for an entrepreneur veri…es the asset equation:
A vacant job neither yields cost nor gain. It is …lled at the Poisson rate q ( ). The value J v of a vacancy thus veri…es the asset equation:
II.4 Banks
When a bank is in contact with a …lled job, it receives a ‡ow r k of reimbursment. Since the job is dissolved at the Poisson rate > 0 and the bank …nances itself at rate , the value B for a bank to be in contact with a …lled job veri…es the asset equation
When a bank is in contact with a vacant job, the latter is unable to pay back its debt until the job becomes …lled. Therefore, the value B v of a bank to be in contact with a vacant job veri…es:
Perfect competition in the banking sector decreases the lending interest rate r until the zeropro…t condition B v k = 0 in the banking sector is met. This last condition pins down B v = k and _ B v = 0. Therefore, the interest rate adjusts so that, at each point in time:
Summing (3) and (5) gives
J +B equals the total value of a …lled job for the bank and the entrepreneur. It yields a constant pro…t that equals output y minus wage w and is dissolved at rate . This equation featuring forward-looking variables is unstable. Assuming away bubbles implies at each point in time:
II.5 Job creation
There are two constraints on the job creation.
1. Assume that creating a vacant job induces a once-for-all disutility cost c 0. The net gain of creating a job should be nonnegative, so J v c. If this constraint is binding, then
Using (4) imply that at each point in time
This expression combined with with (7) and (8) gives : As in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) , this relation de…nes a tightness level independently of the employment level. Hence in the (L; ) plan, this curve is horizontal. Below, tightness is lower, so J v is higher than c and entrepreneurs want to create more vacancies. 3 2. Banks require collateral to lend money. More speci…cally, a fraction 1= of the lending is required as collateral. This puts an upper limit on the stock of credit k (V + L). We assume that …lled jobs are the only collateralized asset in this economy. Therefore, the credit constraint writes:
since in case of default by the entrepreneurs, the bank remains the …nancier of the job (and as such values the job B) but can also resell the job to another entrepreneur (and as such values the job J as well). In the limit case where tends to in…nity, entrepreneurs do not need collateral to borrow. Using V = (1 L) and (8), the credit constraint implies at each point in time:
Whenever (9) and (10) hold with strict inequality, entrepreneurs …nd pro…table to create additional vacancies and are able to borrow additional credit. The number of vacancies then instantaneously rises, pushing tightness upwards. The right-hand side of (9) and the left-hand side of (10) increase. Therefore, entrepreneurs create vacancies until one of the two constraints binds. So, at each point in time:
The …rst term in the right-hand side does not depend upon employment , while the second increases with employment. Therefore, in the (L; ) map, Equation (11) can be depicted by a curve which is …rst increasing (corresponding to the constrained regime) and then horizontal (corresponding to the unconstrained regime) (See the curves labeled JC in Figure 1 ).
If the credit constraint (10) is not binding, Equation (9) holds with equality, which determines at each point in time, thereby at the steady state. Then the level of employment converges to its stationary value according to (1) . The speed of convergence is given by + q ( ).
Assume now that the credit constraint (10) is binding. Therefore, one has
This de…nes an upward-sloping and convex relationship in the (L; ) map, which tends to 0 as L tends to 0 and tends to 1 when the economy converges to full employment. At a steady state, using (2) to substitute L in (10) leads to
The left-hand side increases in , so a constrained steady state is unique. 5 Hence, apart from the trivial L = = 0 steady state, the JC and BC curves intersect only once in Figure 1 , such an intersection de…ning a steady-state equilibrium. Moreover, when productivity y increases, or when the wage w or the level of capital required to create a job k decrease, or when …nancial market improves (so that increases) tightness increases. Since the JC curve moves upwards as y or increases 6 or w or k decreases, the BC curve has to be steeper than the JC curve to be consistent with the static comparative properties of the steady state, as Figure 1 illustrates.
Finally, since the economy lies in the JC curve at any point in time when the credit constraint is binding, the (non-trivial) steady state is stable.
We now examine whether unemployment is more or less persistent when the credit constraint (10) 
Recall that q (:) is decreasing in over R + . Let us denote q = lim where it is understood that =q = +1 if q = 0 and =q = 0 if q = +1. 6 When …nancial market improves (higher ), only the constrained part of the JC curve shifts upwards. Hence the kink moves leftwards and the horizontal part remains at the same height, contrary to what is represented in Figure 1 , which corresponds to changes in y, w and k.
where ( ) = q 0 ( ) =q ( ) 2 (0; 1) denotes the elasticity of the matching function Q (:; :) with respect to the stock of unemployment. In steady state
Thus, employment converges at a lower rate to its steady-state value when the economy is credit constrained. To understand why, let us denote by L ( ) = q ( ) = ( + q ( )) the level of employment which equilibrates labor in ‡ows and out ‡ows. When tightness is constant, which is the case in the unconstrained regime, employment converges in an autoregressive fashion towards its stationary target L ( ). Conversely, in the constrained regime, tightness increases in L, as a rise in employment increases the stock of collateralized assets. Then, when employment is below (above) the L ( ) target, employment increases (decreases) for the same " ‡ow-rebalancing"
reason as in the unconstrained regime. However, this increase (decrease) in turn implies an increase (decrease) of the L ( ) target. As a matter of fact, the convergence towards the steady state is delayed, explaining why employment will converge at a slower pace in the constrained regime.
To …x ideas on how important is the persistence di¤erence between the two regimes from a quantitative viewpoint, let us recall that around the steady state, the speed of convergence is given by + q ( ) in the unconstrained regime and ( ) ( + q ( )) in the constrained regime. 
III Empirics
In this section we investigate empirically, on macro-panel data, the impact of the credit market 7 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 8 The de…nitions and description of the variables are in Appendix.
III.1 Estimated models
To test whether credit market imperfections increase unemployment persistence, we compare the estimates of the following three equations. 9 U R i;t = U R i;t 1 + X i;t + i + t + " i;t (12a)
where U R it is the aggregate rate of unemployment, U R i;t 1 the lagged rate of unemployment, i and t are country-and time-…xed e¤ects. X i;t is a vector of standard unemployment determinants in the literature. It here includes the average unemployment bene…t replacement rate (ARR), the degree of coordination of wage bargaining (CORP ), the union membership rates (U N DEN S), the tax wedge (T W ), the degree of employment protection legislation (EP L), the average degree of stringency of product market regulation (P M R), and the OECD measure of output gap (OGAP ) which particularly aims at controlling for the unemployment e¤ects of aggregate demand ‡uctuations over the business cycle (see e.g., Bassanini and Duval 2006).
Equation (12a) is our benchmark where unemployment is explained only by its lagged value
and other standard determinants in the literature. The coe¢ cient of the lagged value is our empirical measure of unemployment persistence.
We capture in Equation (12b) the e¤ect of the …nancial market development on the level of unemployment by introducing an indicator of the stringency of credit constraints: the share of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (CRE). It measures isolated credit issued to the private sector as opposed to credit issued to governments and public enterprises. Furthermore, it concentrates on credit issued by intermediaries other than the central bank. It is a measure of the activity of …nancial intermediaries in one of its main function: channeling savings to investors. The higher this indicator, the less stringent credit constraints. Credit market frictions may have a steady-state e¤ect on unemployment which is captured by coe¢ cient in (12b).
Moreover, we introduce in Equation (12c) an interaction term between credit market imperfection and lagged unemployment. U R and CRE respectively stand for the means of unemployment rates and of the share of private credit by deposit money banks in GDP over the whole sample. The coe¢ cient thus speci…cally captures how credit market imperfections in‡uence unemployment persistence, while their e¤ect on steady-state unemployment is captured by parameter .
Since we exploit similar OECD data for labor market institutions, we follow Bassanini and Duval (2006) and use the Generalized Least Square estimation method allowing for heteroscedastic errors. Doing so, we are also consistent with the methodology of Nickell et al. (2005) , on a di¤erent set of data. Country-…xed e¤ects i capture unobserved heterogeneity between countries, while time-…xed e¤ects t control for world trends and business cycle.
Institutional variables X i;t and CRE i;t are time-varying. Changes in unemployment may cause potential policy reactions that would a¤ect these variables. This could generate simultaneous biases, so that an indenti…cation issue arises and we have to rely on an instrumental 2SLS approach. This problem potentially concerns all the variables in the right-hand side of Equations (12) . However, since our particular focus is on credit market imperfections, we only instrument CRE i;t (in speci…cations 12b and 12c) and CRE i;t CRE U R i;t 1 U R (in speci…cation 12c). For sake of methodological robustness, we provide estimates of Equations (12) both with and without instruments.
III.2 Main results
Results (see Table 1 ) suggest that:
Whatever the speci…cation, the estimated coe¢ cient for the one-period lagged unem- on unemployment does not seem robust to the introduction of …nancial development variables. In the third speci…cation, the tax wedge (T W ) appears as a signi…cant (10% level) factor of unemployment increase, which is in accordance with previous theoretical and empirical research. Employment protection legislation (EP L), whose theoretical e¤ects on Estimate coe¢ cients are signi…cant at the 1% level if ***, 5% if **, 10% if *: Student T-statistics are given in brackets beneath the coe¢ cients.
Nota: U R and CRE respectively stand for the means of U R i;t 1 and CRE i;t
Instruments used in column (3): P M R i;t 1 , P U BOW N i;t 2
Instruments used in column (5): ARR i;t 1 ; P M R i;t 1 ; OGAP i;t 2 ; CRE i;t 1 ; CRE i;t 2 unemployment are ambiguous (since it can decrease both unemployment entry and exit) appears to lower unemployment.
-The coe¢ cient associated with rigidities in the goods market (P M R) is signi…cantly positive, which is consistent with previous research. Rents and other non-competitive features on the product market would tend to increase unemployment.
-The output gap measure (OGAP ) would signi…cantly reduce unemployment. This index is computed as the di¤erence between the actual output of an economy and its "fullcapacity" production potential, and thus has a negative sign. A negative coe¢ cient associated with OGAP implies that a reduction in the output gap reduces the unemployment level. This result is theoretically consistent, and perfectly in line with Bassanini and Duval (2006) .
The ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (CRE), which we understand as inversely related to the stringency of credit constraints, would signi…cantly reduce the unemployment level. The estimated coe¢ cient is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 10% level for speci…cation (12b), and at the 5% level for speci…cation (12c), with the expected negative sign. Interestingly, the introduction of this variable would not change the main …ndings for speci…cation (12a).
The ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP would signi…cantly reduce the unemployment persistence (1% level). The estimated coe¢ cient is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 1% level, with the expected negative sign, which gives a strong support to our theoretical analysis. We are quite con…dent in the robustness of this e¤ect, since it does not destabilize the results of speci…cations (12a) and (12b) previously commented.
We now turn to the possible endogeneity of credit variables CRE i;t and CRE i;t CRE U R i;t 1 U R : Column 3 provides alternative estimates of speci…cation (12b) using 2SLS, instrumenting CRE i;t by P M R i;t 1 (…rst lag of the OECD Product Market Regulation Index) and P U BOW N i;t 2 (second lag of the OECD public ownership index, a component of the PMR index measuring the scope of public enterprise, size of public entreprise, special voting rights and control of public enterprise by legislative bodies).
Column 5 provides alternative estimates of speci…cation (12c), instrumenting CRE i;t and CRE i;t CRE U R i;t 1 U R by ARR i;t 1 ; P M R i;t 1 ; OGAP i;t 2 ; CRE i;t 1 ; and
The results of …rst-stage within regressions are available in Table 4 These instrumental 2SLS estimations give further support to our quantitative …ndings.
IV Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that credit market imperfections impact not only the level of unemployment, but also its persistence. For this purpose, we …rst develop our theoretical argument in a simple model based on the equilibrium matching framework of Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides (2000) where we introduce credit constraints à la Matsuyama (2007) . We show these credit constraints not only increase steady-state unemployment, but also slow down the transitional dynamics. We then provide an empirical illustration based on a macro-panel dataset of 19 OECD countries. Our results suggest that credit market imperfections would signi…cantly increase the persistence of unemployment.
Some directions for further research naturally follow. First, we want to consider alternative measurements for the stringency of credit constraints. Second, we aim at generalizing the analysis to the case of endogenous job destruction. Third, we plan to investigate how the introduction of another collateralizable asset (aside from labor) would change the analysis. We intend to pursue these projects in the soon future. 
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